

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**WHITHER KOSOVO?
THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE**

by

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ABSTRACT

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With the world focused on the aftermath of September 11th, 2001, as well as additional terrorist attacks and threats around the world since then, the problem of the “final status” of Serbia’s province of Kosovo has taken a back seat to more pressing foreign policy issues in both the United States and Europe. While the international community can continue to ignore this question, it will have to be addressed at some point and this may be in the near future. There are a myriad of potential solutions for determining Kosovo’s future in the abstract, very few seem feasible in reality. However, of all the potential options available, full independence is probably the least desirable. While there are best and worst case scenarios for Kosovo’s future, what is likely to happen is that Kosovo will make slow progress towards meeting the objectives laid out by the United Nations (UN). The UN and KFOR will remain to provide both the leadership and stability needed to continue to move forward. If the UN is ultimately able to leave, a peacekeeping force will be required to ensure both internal and external stability. Kosovo in the future will look much like it does today with Serbs living in enclaves and multi-ethnicity a figment in the international communities’ mind.

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WHITHER KOSOVO? THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE

With the world focused on the aftermath of September 11th, 2001, as well as additional terrorist attacks and threats around the world since then, the problem of the “final status”¹ of Serbia’s province of Kosovo has taken a back seat to more pressing foreign policy issues in both the United States and Europe. A resultant lack of focus, coupled with the current relative stability in Kosovo due to the presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led international peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR), allows the West to continue to ignore the issue.

Exacerbating this already complex problem is an unclear road map by the organization charged with administering Kosovo - the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)² - on exactly how to move forward to achieve its objectives prior to determining Kosovo’s final solution. Additionally, a lack of quantifiable metrics to accurately measure Kosovo’s progress for developing key areas such as democratic institutions, the rule of law, refugee and displaced persons returns, and others also hampers resolution of an already complicated issue.³

While the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Kosovo Michael Steiner⁴ recently developed “benchmarks”⁵ in an attempt to guide and measure progress, these remain vague and lack specific objectives needed to gauge their effectiveness. Steiner himself diminished the importance of these benchmarks saying in a recent interview that, “...to reach the benchmarks constitutes the preconditions for continuing down the road that will allow us to resolve Kosovo’s final status.”⁶ The benchmarks fail to address the real issue of how to reach a political settlement for Kosovo and place another nebulous intermediate objective on an already confusing path to final status.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 signed on 10 June 1999 placed Kosovo (still considered part of Serbia and Montenegro) under the United Nations (UN). Ostensibly, Kosovo remains a UN protectorate leaving the question of final status open-ended. Unlike the political settlement that was negotiated for Bosnia with the Dayton Accords, Kosovo has yet to reach a political solution or have one proposed, from the potential options available.⁷ The wording in UNSCR 1244 states the UN goal as, “pending a final settlement, promoting substantial autonomy and self government in Kosovo”.⁸ It further states that, “...the international civil presence will facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status”.⁹

Indeed, UNSCR 1244 charges the international community to solve the problem of Kosovo. However, the resolution delineated no timeline for determining Kosovo's final status or the commencement of dialogue on the issue. While the international community can continue to ignore this question, it will have to be addressed at some point and this may be in the near future.

Despite the Bush administration's desires to reduce military force commitments and eventually withdraw from Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans, the prospect of long-term international military involvement - with or without the United States - will remain into the foreseeable future. While future United States involvement may not be with military forces, it will certainly remain engaged diplomatically to determine a political solution for Kosovo. The United States must use its diplomatic power in conjunction with Europe to solve this problem. The United States is the only nation that has both the credibility and political clout to assist in determining the final political settlement.

While no one in the international community discusses the length of international involvement in Kosovo, it will assuredly be more than any currently participating country desires. Kosovo is undergoing nation building from the ground up and it will take time to get institutions established, functioning, and transferred to local control. To exit prematurely means Kosovo will undoubtedly fail to become the multiethnic democracy that the international community is working so hard to achieve. While being careful not to equate the situations in Bosnia and Kosovo since they are different in many ways, United States military forces in Bosnia's Stabilization Force (SFOR) are rapidly approaching their eighth year on the ground with no clear timeline for their withdrawal in sight. Using this as a potential barometer for Kosovo, and given the fact that there have been no successful minority Serb returns to date (a precondition for a multiethnic Kosovo) a robust United States component of KFOR will remain until at least 2010.¹⁰ An international military and civilian presence will likely remain for an indefinite time period.

While there are a myriad of potential solutions for determining Kosovo's future in the abstract, very few seem feasible in reality. There are two options at either end of the spectrum that should not be seriously considered. The first is granting Kosovo independence from Serbia, thus allowing it to become a sovereign nation state. The second is allowing it to return to the control of Belgrade. Many in the West refuse to rule out the independence option. However, of the options available, full independence is probably the least desirable. In this paper I will state why the issue of final status must be addressed, state reasons why Kosovo should not become independent, the impact of any decision on Serbia, discuss why the United States should remain involved, and finally propose alternative solutions to independence. Additionally a

recommendation on the direction that should be pursued with respect to determining Kosovo's future will be proposed.

WHY FINAL STATUS MUST BE ADDRESSED

The issue must be addressed if for no other reason than because world events are pressing forward. With the United States and its allies involved in a war against terrorism they can ill afford the drain on resources that Balkan engagement demands. Time continues to work against the international community and donor countries will grow weary of providing soldiers and/or monetary assistance if they continue to see little improvement. Indeed, Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO in his one year assessment in 2000 said, "UNMIK is plagued with insufficient resources in all it tries to do. Much has been done however much remains to be done."¹¹

Given the diametrically opposed nature of President Bush's desire to withdraw military forces from Kosovo and the Kosovars' (both Serb and Albanian) desire for continued United States involvement, the issue must be addressed if the United States intends to withdraw its forces. If the United States hopes to transfer the Kosovo operation to the European Union (EU) the Albanians will no doubt want assurances that the issue of final status is addressed, particularly since many in the EU are against independence. The United States may force the international community into action in order to extricate its forces.

Serbia and Montenegro¹² are seeking consideration for entrance into the EU.¹³ While it appears this will not happen in 2004 as Serbia would like, it must happen at some point if Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the rest of the former Yugoslav Republics, are to truly recover and make it on their own without substantial international economic aid. One of the major objectives for the Stability Pact was to integrate the countries of southeastern Europe into the European Union.¹⁴ While Serbia and Montenegro was not part of the original pact, it has since been incorporated and now receives substantial economic aid. The EU will need to know if Serbia and Montenegro will enter with or without Kosovo. Either option creates significant obstacles for both the EU and Serbia and Montenegro. While the EU can certainly delay or deny Serbia and Montenegro entrance into the EU, if Kosovo and the rest of the Former Yugoslav Republics are to strengthen economically, they need substantial investment from EU nations and the potential economic prosperity EU membership brings.

Kosovar Albanians will not be satisfied until a final solution is determined. Their preferred option is independence but they realize that they must at least have legislative, judicial, and executive governmental structures in place and functioning before the question of independence

is even a viable consideration. Additionally, they must be able to survive on their own without substantial international direction and support. The worst case scenario is that Albanian extremists will become frustrated in this process and again resort to violence in an attempt to force a solution.

There is precedence for Albanian extremist violence throughout the region. After NATO forces entered Kosovo in 1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was disbanded. However, insurgent groups patterned after the KLA emerged. The Albanian insurgent groups of the Liberation Army of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja (UCPMB) and the National Liberation Army (NLA) were both modeled after the KLA and are believed to be comprised of former KLA fighters.¹⁵ After the arrival of NATO peacekeeping forces, both the UCPMB and NLA fought in southern Serbia and Macedonia respectively attempting to destabilize these regions. It is believed that both of these groups have connections to the former KLA. Albanian patience will last only so long and there are many willing to resort to violence to bring attention to their cause.

Real stability in the region can not be achieved until Kosovo's final status is determined and both Pristina and Belgrade agree on a political settlement. Belgrade already attempts to meddle in the internal affairs of Kosovo, seeking to promote destabilization. Any solution that Belgrade does not agree to, or is imposed, will only make matters worse. Stability in Kosovo, as well as the rest of Southeastern Europe, is vital to Europe. Many will argue that Kosovo was not a core United States interest and that our engagement was only the product of a humanitarian intervention. However, with the United States increasingly reliant on stability to fuel markets in the global economy Ivo Daalder put it best when he said, "what happens in Southeastern Europe is a fundamental interest to the United States."¹⁶ I will discuss later why the United States should remain involved in the region.

Finally, and most importantly, the Rambouillet accords which formed the basis for UNSCR 1244, called for "an international meeting to determine a mechanism for a final settlement of Kosovo three years after its enactment".¹⁷ This three year time period expired on June 10, 2002. The international community can continue to ignore Kosovo, but it will only be a matter of time before the Albanian majority will attempt to politicize the issue in order to pressure the international community into action. While many in the United States and elsewhere around the world view Kosovo as a European problem, the United States will play a substantial role in facilitating its political solution.

WHY KOSOVO SHOULD NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT

It is clear that the Albanian majority in Kosovo desires independence from Belgrade influence and is attempting to achieve this goal. Much to the chagrin of the international community, Kosovo's newly elected President Ibrahim Rugova stated in his first speech as President on March 4, 2002, " We will work to build a free, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, and independent Kosova".¹⁸ This was further reinforced by Kosovo parliamentarian Dr. Alush Gashi in his testimony before the Helsinki Commission in June 2002 where he stated, "The overwhelming majority of Kosovo citizens are committed to work hard for a Kosovo which is democratic, independent, multiethnic, with its place at the United Nations."¹⁹ Regardless of Albanian desires, an independent Kosovo is not prudent for a number of reasons.

One of the major reasons Kosovo should not become independent is because it lacks the executive, legislative and judicial systems necessary to effectively govern. It is no wonder why the Kosovars require significant international assistance. UNMIK had the monumental task of developing, from the ground up, governmental structures where none previously existed with the ultimate goal of facilitating elections and transferring governance to local control. While it was UNMIK's responsibility to initially perform these civilian functions and ultimately transition them to a self governing Kosovo, current systems are unable to function adequately.²⁰ According to the International Crisis Group in March 2002, " The time when KFOR and UNMIK will be able to bow out of Kosovo leaving behind a functioning administration and a stable society, is some way off. "²¹

With the second round of municipal elections just completed in October 2002, governing at the local level is still problematic. The intent after the first round of municipal elections was to transfer governance from international administrators to the local municipalities. In some instances it took over a year to transfer functions to the local assembly.²² Even today, UNMIK's international administrators are still heavily involved in running institutions at the local level. Additionally, some administrators have advocated increased international involvement and more oversight at the municipal level.²³

The transition from communism to democracy will not be easy or rapidly executed. Having no previous experience with democracy or democratic institutions it is not surprising that these institutions are taking longer than normal to form and newly elected officials are having difficulty adapting.

If the problem is difficult locally, it is even more problematic at the parliamentary or provincial level. This is the first time that a democratically elected parliament has been formed in

Kosovo and its members are unaccustomed to functioning as a legislative body.²⁴ One only needs to look at the November 2001 parliamentary elections and the 3 months it took to elect the President of Kosovo to see how difficult self-governing will be.²⁵

The political parties themselves further complicate governing. While pluralism is important, the excessive number of political parties creates confusion and diffuses effort. With multiple Albanian parties vying for power, each unwilling to compromise, political infighting rises to the forefront instead of strengthening institutions and governing their countrymen. Without an effective governmental structure in place that can draft and pass legislation there is no effective governing of the local populous.

The rule of law is critically important to any society that expects to govern itself and function as an independent entity. Kosovo still faces challenges in this area. Without the rule of law, organized crime and terrorists have the freedom to operate with impunity. They also deny Kosovo stability. Vital to this effort are a fully functioning judiciary, professional police forces, and incarceration facilities to prosecute and enforce the rule of law. While the judiciary has made huge strides, it has a long way to go. Serious concerns remain about the capacity of the judiciary to apply the reformed legal framework; to ensure the impartial dispensation of justice; to exercise its role free from political interference; and to investigate crimes.²⁶ It is no wonder the judiciary is having difficulty considering that it had to be totally reconstituted.²⁷

A civilized society requires an unbiased and professional police force to enforce its laws and maintain order. While the multiethnic Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was formed to assume this role, it too requires significant development to become the force envisioned to maintain order in Kosovo. An Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report cites limited capacity of police to gather and analyze forensic evidence, occasional failure to read arrestees their rights, and failure to get those arrested before a judge in 24 hours.²⁸ Additionally, ethnic bias, training, and screening for past crimes or atrocities must also be given closer scrutiny. The inability to enforce laws and prosecute criminals free from prejudice invites a whole host of problems that could threaten the very existence of Kosovo.

Organized crime, drug and human traffickers, and terrorists all operate in areas where police and the judiciary are unable to control or prosecute their activities. An independent Kosovo unable to effectively govern or maintain law and order has the potential to implode, leaving the United States and Europe with a much larger problem of a failed nation state. If an independent Kosovo becomes a failed state, it may be a far worse problem than what currently exists for the international community. Given the extent of organized crime today, and the potential for terrorist activity, it is not hard to imagine what a failed Kosovo might look like.

While struggles for independence free from tyranny are not new, Kosovo should not be independent because it sets a dangerous precedent for the Balkans in particular and other regions of the world in general. If the oppressed people of a nation state could secede to form a sovereign nation, be they in the majority or minority, with international approval, it opens the door for others to do so. Nowhere is this more problematic than in the Balkans. One of the huge implications of an independent Kosovo is what it means for other Albanians living in the region. Many Albanians already desire a “greater Albania”.

With a substantial minority population of Albanians in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) the potential for unrest and instability throughout the region remains a constant threat. The nearly homogeneous minority Albanian population living in the northern and western portions of the FYROM has some reason to claim oppression by the Macedonian Slavs. They could attempt to segment off this area of the FYROM and either become an independent state or annex themselves to Kosovo. A similar situation exists with the minority Albanian population living in the Presevo Valley. An independent Kosovo would only fuel this instability and may attempt to become involved in these regions to support minority Albanians or gain the territory where they live. Any attempt to redraw the borders of Kosovo along ethnic lines will only further destabilize the region. The desire for a “greater Albania” will remain a problem in the region regardless of Kosovo’s final status.

Albania maintains close ties with Kosovar and Macedonian Albanians. Weapons for the KLA and NLA were smuggled from Albania to support both of these groups before and after NATO’s arrival. An independent Kosovo allows a “greater Albania” to become a reality. With Kosovo and Albania sharing a common border, it would be relatively easy for them to reach a settlement redrawing their borders. Albania is in no position to support Kosovo economically or politically. In fact, as a sovereign nation Albania has many of the problems that Kosovo is experiencing to include ineffective government, lack of border control, organized crime, and drug and human trafficking.

Another more dangerous example involves the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although difficult given the Dayton Accords and UN oversight, the Republic of Sprska (RS) in Bosnia-Herzegovina could seek to either become an independent state within Bosnia, (instead of an entity) or more likely, seek to attach itself to Serbia. Some have even proposed that the RS be given to Serbia as compensation for the potential loss of Kosovo.²⁹ Any of these options would only further complicate the issue and destabilize the region further.

This issue is clearly not limited to the Balkans. Chechnya continues its struggle for independence from the Russian Federation. While each situation is different, the implications are clear. Other groups seeking to leverage their positions and strengthen their causes would almost certainly cite Kosovo independence as an example.

An independent Kosovo surmises that it can stand on its own economically, promote stability to gain and maintain outside investment to finance its institutions, privatize communist era industries, and improve its citizens' standard of living. Whether it can survive and prosper economically remains to be seen. Given Kosovo's poor economic conditions and its reliance on international aid it will be a challenge for Kosovo to raise the capital required to be able to govern effectively.³⁰ Independence does nothing to further stability in order to attract much needed capital, and it will likely detract from it.

Additionally, the transition from centralized communist economic policies to capitalism and privatized businesses has not been easy. A commission on promoting sustainable economies in the Balkans sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2000 stated, "Privatization of publicly owned companies has proceeded badly and failed to produce a strong competitive private sector".³¹

From the beginning of UNMIK's tenure until 2001, Kosovo generated no capital and relied almost entirely on donor aid to finance its expenditures.³² While Kosovo has started to generate income from customs duties, value-added taxes, and a new payroll tax, it will require continued donor support at high levels for some time into the future.³³ Political instability and the potential for conflict, violence, and war are powerful disincentives for investment.³⁴ Given the vicious cycle of Kosovo seeking foreign capital to survive and this capital avoiding it until stability exists, Kosovo is likely to remain tethered to international donors to survive for an undetermined amount of time into the future.

Independence implies that Kosovo will become a sovereign nation. This brings two important concepts of the nation state into the equation. First, a nation state has definable borders and at least some capability to control these borders. Kosovo is currently incapable of controlling its own borders. If Kosovo were to become independent, a border service would have to be established for the purpose of regulating traffic and collecting taxes. A border service does not currently exist and UN and KFOR forces man border checkpoints. However, these checkpoints only serve to adjudicate movement along major established routes. The borders surrounding Kosovo on all sides are extremely porous. There are numerous unauthorized areas all around Kosovo where illegal crossing is not only possible, but regularly occurs. Even with KFOR patrolling along these borders, illegal activity and crossings are regular

events. The ability to stem this activity is almost impossible and would require an enormous amount of manpower. KFOR lacks the ability to adequately control illegal activity along the borders. A Kosovo border service would face similar challenges.

This lack of border control leads to other problems that Kosovo is already experiencing. One is the problem of organized crime. Organized crime is dominant in Kosovo and these organizations are involved in all kinds of illegal activity that thrive on instability.³⁵ The lack of border control creates conditions that allow criminals and potential terrorists to move freely in and out of Kosovo without the fear of being noticed, tracked, or apprehended.

Additionally, a major issue for Kosovo will be tax collection and customs duties because these will have a direct impact on the funding of Kosovo's democratic institutions. UNMIK currently runs the tax collection points at established border crossings. A created Kosovo border service would have to assume these responsibilities. Currently, the loss of revenue from taxes due to illegal border crossing is a serious issue. UNMIK convened a regional cigarette smuggling conference in May 2002 to "... fight smugglers throughout the Balkans who steal millions of Euros in tax revenue".³⁶ Weapons, soldiers, and everything else have been, and can again, be smuggled along many of these same routes.

The other concept associated with a nation state is that it must have some ability to defend itself. While not every nation state is capable of doing this, it is important for Kosovo because of its contested status and the threat from regional aggressors. The biggest question concerning an independent Kosovo is who would perform this function. While the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) views itself as the army of an independent Kosovo, it will most likely not be given this opportunity by the international community. UNSCR 1244 outlined the demilitarization of the KLA and subsequently transformed them into the disaster relief organization of the KPC.³⁷ Without some military capability, an independent Kosovo has no way to protect itself from internal or external threats. While an attack into an independent Kosovo from Serbia may be considered remote, it is not impossible to imagine a scenario in the future where Serbia uses its military or paramilitary forces to protect Serb citizens or patrimonial sites in Kosovo. This likelihood increases if peacekeeping forces are severely reduced.

While the external threat could be viewed as unlikely, the internal threat is much more severe. Kosovo would need a capable force to deal with internal disturbances. These will be generated, as they have been in the past, from the Serb enclaves in opposition to what they feel as unfair treatment. These disturbances often exceed the capability of the KPS and require some sort of military force to restore order. KFOR has responded to many of these threats in the past. If Kosovo is to become truly multiethnic, violent clashes between Serbs and Albanians

can be expected. An independent Kosovo would need a more heavily armed force than the KPS to quell internal disturbances.

The best solution for both internal and external protection, as well as stability for the region, is to have an international military force - albeit smaller in size than exists currently - remain in Kosovo. This military force would provide a credible, unbiased, and evenhanded internal response capability. Additionally, external stability would be enhanced by the continued presence of a NATO led peacekeeping force. Any attack into Kosovo, or against this force, would be viewed as an attack against NATO. This would be considered an attack against a member nation of NATO requiring a military response under Article 5. An independent Kosovo is unlikely to be able to field an ethnically tolerant military force capable of dealing with internal and external threats and maintaining stability in the region.

IMPACT OF INDEPENDENCE ON SERBIA

Any discussion of Kosovo's final status must address the impact on Serbia. UNSCR 1244 states repeatedly "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2".³⁸ Since Kosovo remains part of Serbia, in essence independence would mean the secession of Kosovo from the FRY. No nation wants to willingly lose territory regardless of the reasons behind it. Belgrade must be involved in any political solution for Kosovo and agree with it. Belgrade is unlikely to support the independence option for a number of reasons.

To grant Kosovo independence sets a dangerous precedent for Montenegro and the other Serb province of Vojvodina. Montenegro continues to push for independence from the former FRY. Indeed, the name change to Serbia and Montenegro in the March 2002 agreement between the two was viewed by some as an attempt to placate Montenegro and keep it from immediately declaring its independence. However, this agreement does not resolve the problem of Montenegrin independence. It only calls for a referendum by either Serbia or Montenegro by 2005.³⁹ An independence referendum will most likely not receive approval in the parliament.

Vojvodina is also a province of Serbia similar to Kosovo that had its autonomy rescinded by Milosevic in 1989 as well. Hungarians were once a majority in this province but now only comprise 17% of the population according to a 1991 census.⁴⁰ Given its proximity to Hungary, the Hungarian minority could attempt to destabilize the province and annex itself to Hungary or declare independence, further fragmenting Serbia. While it has been relatively quiet in

Vojvodina, this possibility nonetheless exists. Given their similarities, Vojvodina is no doubt watching what happens in Kosovo closely and an independent Kosovo opens the door for them to declare independence as well.

One of the biggest obstacles to Kosovo's independence will be Belgrade. Kosovo Serb leader Dr. Rada Trajkovic, former head of the leading Serb party in Kosovo, perhaps summed it up best by noting, "...the wish of the Albanians that Kosovo be exclusively their state and the wish of Serbs that Kosovo remain part of their state".⁴¹ Belgrade is unlikely to agree to Kosovo's independence for the reasons stated below.

First, Serbs living in Kosovo are politically linked with Belgrade. Dr. Trajkovic, testifying before the Helsinki Commission, stated, "The Serbs, despite their many problems, can not renounce Kosovo".⁴² Belgrade continues to provide Kosovo Serbs guidance and direction and has established parallel structures through which they influence the political situation in Serb enclaves. This is especially true in the northern part of Kosovo and the city of Mitrovica.⁴³ Low voter turnout by Kosovo Serbs in the October 2002 elections indicates at a minimum Belgrade's reluctance to heartily endorse Kosovo's elections and at worst demonstrates its influence over Serbs living in Kosovo.

While this influence can be viewed as both positive and negative, Belgrade stays involved for good reason. Even though the Serb minority has been integrated into democratic institutions, some directed by the international community, the appearance of multiethnicity in these democratic institutions is a facade. While Albanians continue to espouse democracy and ethnic tolerance, an independent Kosovo is unlikely to be either multiethnic or democratic. As Dr. Trajkovic points out, "The Albanians have the majority and can by outvoting, always impose solutions".⁴⁴ These solutions are likely to favor the Albanian majority leaving minority Serbs without a voice. Even in a democratic Kosovo it will be easy for the Albanian majority to suppress Serb or other minorities. While this is the tyranny of the majority in a democracy, Serbs lack the political clout to be able to affect Kosovo wide issues at the parliamentary level. They will always be in the minority and must form coalitions with majority Albanian parties to get anything done. The time when Kosovo can rise above the issue of ethnicity and provide unbiased governance is a long way off.

While not a significant interest, Belgrade is interested in Kosovo from an economic standpoint. This is particularly true as concerns natural resources. Kosovo is a major producer of lignite coal which Serbia and Montenegro use to produce approximately two-thirds of their power.⁴⁵ Additionally, Mitrovica contains numerous mines that provide various mineral

resources such as silver, gold, and cadmium.⁴⁶ Belgrade will not want to walk away from these resources.

Kosovo remains important to Serbia for cultural reasons. There are many religious sites and churches in Kosovo that Belgrade will be reluctant to walk away from. Currently these sites remain guarded by KFOR. Any solution will have to determine how these sites will be guarded to prevent their destruction or damage. One option proposed to reduce U.S. forces in Multinational Brigade East, during KFOR rotation 4A was to remove the soldiers guarding these sites.⁴⁷ It was never implemented because of the risk it posed to these sites if forces were removed. Belgrade will certainly demand any solution on Kosovo's final status have provisions to protect these sites. Some have even proposed that Serbia provide military or security forces to guard them.

WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REMAIN ENGAGED IN THE REGION

While the level of enthusiasm for United States involvement in Kosovo has waned with the change of administrations and National Security Strategies, one theme has been consistent throughout. The United States will remain engaged in the region because Europe is vital to our interests. A stable Europe and its economic well being are important to the United States and especially the global economy. President Bush's national security strategy states, "A return to strong economic growth in Europe and Japan is vital to U.S. national security interests".⁴⁸ Instability in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe threatens European security.⁴⁹

The question of how a change in Kosovo's status impacts regional stability and Europe is clearly the more important question. Independence, for all of the reasons previously stated, clearly does nothing to support regional stability in the Balkans. A failed state allows organized crime and potentially terrorism to thrive in the absence of the rule of law. The biggest impact of an independent Kosovo could be an increasing willingness to export violent insurgency in support of minority Albanians living in either southern Serbia or northwestern FYROM. An independent Kosovo with potential visions of a "greater Albania" destabilizes the entire Balkans and indirectly Europe. The United States can not afford to have this happen, so it will remain involved to ensure a peaceful transition to whatever settlement is reached for Kosovo. Most importantly for the United States is that European regional stability is maintained and problems in southeastern Europe do not upset this balance.

Any political settlement that makes the region less stable is likely to be immediately felt in Europe and indirectly in the United States. One of the major concerns among western European countries is the impact of refugees. With tens of thousands of refugees from the

Balkans already living in Europe, the economic burden on these nations is immense. Anything that destabilizes the situation in and around Kosovo further only adds to this burden. The refugee problem continues to have a significant impact on Europe and the instability that independence brings will only increase this burden. Europe will receive the brunt of any failed Kosovo policy, but the United States will also be impacted.

ALTERNATIVES TO INDEPENDENCE

The key to any proposed option in the final status discussion is not to make matters worse. There are two options previously stated that should be ruled out from the very beginning. One is to grant Kosovo its independence for all the reasons stated above. The other is to return Kosovo to Belgrade's control. As stated by the Serb leader Dr. Trajkovic, "If Albanians were told that Kosovo was to remain within the framework of Serbia, the effect would be the same as provoking war".⁵⁰ Whatever the final option, Kosovars of all ethnicities must take control of, and deal with, their problems. One of the great challenges in Kosovo, leftover from years of totalitarian Communist regimes, is the unwillingness of Kosavars to take ownership of their problems and future.⁵¹ Instead, they allow the international community to solve their problems for them. If Kosovo is to survive in any form, it must take ownership of its own problems.

The other constant permeating Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans is the unwillingness to compromise. Inherent in any negotiation is compromise. Any future political settlement will certainly involve compromise to be resolved. The Serb and Albanian leadership each must be willing to give up something in order to reach a political solution.

Any decision on Kosovo's final status must involve a minimum of two components to be successful. First is open, honest, and constructive dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.⁵² It will be this dialogue, albeit guided by the international community, that finally leads to a political solution. The other will be United States involvement. The final status of Kosovo requires United States political and diplomatic engagement.⁵³ As stated previously, the United States has the political clout, will, and resolve to see this through to a political settlement. Russia will attempt to assert itself and become involved in the process to show that it is still a player in the region. While Russia may try to influence the outcome for Kosovo, it is no longer the player it once was and lacks the diplomatic firepower to negotiate a settlement. However, Russia will be involved in any UN Security Council vote approving a final political settlement for Kosovo. Having discussed why Kosovo should not become independent, it is time to examine some of

the alternatives to this option. The options below are considered the most viable, but each comes with advantages and disadvantages that could complicate any political settlement.

STATUS QUO (UN PROTECTORATE)

Of the many options available, the most obvious and easiest to implement would be to maintain UN structures and KFOR military forces at current levels. Essentially, Kosovo would remain a UN protectorate. The main advantage of this option is that it maintains stability through continued international presence. Additionally, it allows democratic institutions and Michael Steiner's "benchmarks" to continue to move forward. However, this is not a viable option at current manning levels.

While the international community will remain engaged in Kosovo to guide the nation building process for the foreseeable future, the size and scope will likely be reduced. As previously stated, the international community has a powerful economic disincentive as well as other pressing reasons to stay engaged at current levels. Additionally, without tangible results international donors of military forces and money are likely to withdraw or reduce support.

The other argument against this option is the potential transition of Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans to the EU leadership, or better yet, local leaders. A Council on Foreign Relations Task Force recommends EU leadership in the Balkans to achieve stability, unity of effort, and integration with Europe by 2010.⁵⁴ Ad hoc organizations that currently exist within the UN mission can be phased out and transferred to the EU in order to create unity of effort and develop a coherent strategy that speaks with one voice.⁵⁵

CANTONIZATION

Another option is cantonization or the so called "soft partition"⁵⁶ Cantonization is essentially the partitioning of Kosovo along ethnic lines. This option would allow Serbs in currently existing enclaves to govern themselves independently or, a less preferred option, with some kind of Belgrade involvement. This could become a reality in whatever political solution is agreed to and does not redraw any borders, but separates Serbs and Albanians within Kosovo's current boundaries much like the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The greatest advantage of this option is also its greatest disadvantage. Permanently establishing these enclaves as cantons solves the problem of trying to integrate Serbs and Albanians. However, by establishing cantons a multiethnic Kosovo ceases to exist. This option is a sort of reverse political ethnic cleansing condoned by the international community on behalf of the Albanians. Additionally, it violates UNSCR 1244 that calls for, "...the right of all refugees

and displaced persons to return to their homes".⁵⁷ Serbs and Albanians who are displaced persons and refugees would most likely not be allowed to return to their former properties with this option. Property rights remain a complicated issue in Kosovo and slow progress is being made in this area. However, the return of displaced persons and refugees is still in its infancy. UN policy is still to develop a multiethnic Kosovo. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in a meeting with President Kostunica on November 20, 2002, "Our task is to develop a multiethnic Kosovo where human rights of all minorities will be respected".⁵⁸ Another drawback to this option is security for Serbs in these enclaves. Enclaves that are contiguous and attached to Serbia are less of a security challenge than those that are totally surrounded by Albanians. Freedom of movement outside of and between these enclaves remains an issue today with KFOR escorting Serb convoys. Without adequate unbiased protection, Serbs remain potentially at risk in isolated enclaves or as they travel between them.

The other significant obstacle is what to do in cities where Serbs and Albanians occupy portions of the same city. There are areas, such as Gnjilane and Kamenica in Multinational Brigade East's sector where Serbs and Albanians coexist, albeit in separate parts of the city. Cantonization in these areas will not work and it makes little sense to have two governments and the associated overhead to support the two ethnicities in these areas. The alternative is to move minority Serbs in these areas to all Serb cantons. While Kosovo Serbs essentially live in isolated cantons now, it makes no sense for the international community to officially make them permanent and condone ethnic segregation destroying any potential hope of a multiethnic Kosovo. This option would require an international peacekeeping force to protect minority Serbs or act as a buffer between Serb and Albanian cantons, as well as an international civilian presence to facilitate property rights for those that are displaced.

LOOSE FEDERATION

This option makes Kosovo an independent state within the existing framework of Serbia and Montenegro without UN membership.⁵⁹ Kosovo would become part of the federation along with the two republics of Serbia and Montenegro. The biggest advantage of this option is that it solves the problem of sovereignty and the redrawing of the boundaries of Serbia and Montenegro.⁶⁰ However, the drawback is Kosovo remains part of the former FRY and is not outright independent. The Albanians are unlikely to agree to any option that lets Kosovo remain under control of Belgrade regardless of how nominal that control may seem to be.⁶¹ For this option to be effective Kosovo and Belgrade would have to agree to some degree of autonomy for Kosovo.

Another issue is Montenegrin independence. If at some point Montenegro were granted independence in a referendum, or worse yet seceded, Kosovo would almost certainly demand or do the same. Belgrade is unlikely to let Montenegro, Kosovo, and possibly Vojvodina go with or without a referendum and see its territory diminished. This option could destabilize the region further without an international peacekeeping presence.

The Albanians would assuredly frustrate the return of Serb refugees in this option. Without the international community, the Albanians are unlikely to cooperate with Belgrade on this or the issue of property rights. Again, failure of refugee Serbs to return to Kosovo goes directly against the international community's desires to see a multiethnic Kosovo. Serb security is also an issue in this option. Some international force will need to provide security for Serbs living in isolated enclaves and also for patrimonial sites. While this option may seem promising it would still require international civilian and military components to ensure security and smooth unbiased functioning of governmental structures.

COMMONWEALTH

This option is essentially the same as the option described above, but Kosovo would be granted UN membership.⁶² This option also has all of the same advantages and disadvantages of the loose federation option stated above. In addition, there is one other big disadvantage. The Security Council would have to approve this option and grant Kosovo admission into the UN.⁶³ Trying to convince Russia that Kosovo should be allowed into the UN could be a major stumbling block. Additionally, other members on the Security Council such as France and China may decide not to support this option. Choosing this option would require an international security and civilian presence to succeed.

HARD PARTITION

In this option, the northern municipalities of Zvecan, Zubin, Potok, Leposavic that are closest to Serbia, as well as Mitrovica north of the Ibar River, would become part of Serbia.⁶⁴ These areas all have a Serb majority living there already. The remaining municipalities could then form a separate Kosovo, comprised mainly of Albanians, either as part of a loose federation or commonwealth. This option has a host of potential issues that come with it.

Redrawing the borders of the newly established "Kosovo" is certain to cause friction among the Serb and Albanian leadership. Both will have issues with any redrawn borders and attempt to gain as much territory as possible. The boundary between the partitions then would become like the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) that separates the two entities in Bosnia.

Some international force would have to be positioned along this boundary to provide security. Based on the political sensitivity of borders in this region, it is unlikely this will be an easy process.

This option is also at odds with a multiethnic Kosovo. Minority Serbs and Albanians are unlikely to stay in what is currently Kosovo and will have to be escorted to either the Serb or Albanian side of the partition. If minority Serbs or Albanians decide to stay, someone would have to provide them protection. This also further complicates the property rights issue as people leave their homes for either side. Lastly, this will stop any Serb returns since they are unlikely to return to a homogenous Albanian “Kosovo”.

SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY UNDER EUROPEAN UNION CONTROL

In this option, the UN would transition responsibility for administering Kosovo to the EU over an agreed upon timetable.⁶⁵ The EU would then be charged as the sole organization to oversee the continued development of Kosovo’s progress to agreed upon standards. These standards could be much like Steiner’s current “benchmarks”. Once these standards are reached, Kosovo would be allowed to govern itself with international monitors providing oversight. Additionally, an appropriate size international peacekeeping force - perhaps solely from Europe - would remain to provide a safe and secure environment. At some point in the future, after proving they can govern themselves, the EU and other international partners could determine the right political solution for Kosovo be it independence or not.

This option does a number of things. It places the responsibility for Kosovo on the EU and does not diminish the sovereignty of Serbia. It demonstrates that the EU has the wherewithal to take the lead and responsibility for problems in its own backyard; although Europe is carrying most of the load for the Balkans currently. It maintains an international military presence to ensure a smooth transition of government to local control while maintaining regional stability.

This option has many of the same problems that have been previously discussed. It might appear that this option would mean the withdrawal of United States forces. However, United States military forces are likely to remain necessary until 2010, predominately because of the trust and credibility they bring as seen by the Serbs and Albanians.⁶⁶ Additionally, the United States will be taking the lead in this area diplomatically to facilitate dialogue for any political solution.

CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE

This option has a lot of appeal and it appears the UN is moving in this direction. It requires the Albanians to meet predetermined standards in certain areas such as functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, substantial refugee returns, and so on with the ultimate objective of becoming independent.⁶⁷ Steiner's "benchmarks" appear to be these standards. Under this option Kosovo, not the UN or EU, is responsible for meeting standards in prescribed areas. These standards can be tied to "carrots or sticks" to guide Kosovo to speed up the process or overcome obstacles. It addresses Albanian desires for independence, but does not grant outright independence. It ensures an independent Kosovo meets international standards and is survivable. Additionally, it puts off dealing with the issue of sovereignty since the UN or EU would administer Kosovo until specified conditions are met.

The major drawback to this option is the length of time it will take to achieve these standards, if Kosovo can even obtain them at all. Based on the evidence presented above on why Kosovo should not become independent, it is likely to be faced with significant challenges. Even if Kosovo could meet specified standards and become independent, an international security force will be required indefinitely.⁶⁸ It will be needed to keep "greater Albania" desires in check as well as deter anyone in the region attempting to interfere in Kosovo's affairs. Additionally, this option assumes Kosovo can control its own borders and deal with internal threats.

CONCLUSION

Given all of the options available what should the final status of Kosovo look like? In the end there is no easy solution to the final status question of Kosovo. Jacques Rupnik summed it up best when he said, "None of the available options for confronting Kosovo's future status is appealing. If an obvious and satisfactory solution existed, it would already be known; all one can therefore usefully do is examine each option's implications and suggest the most viable for the future".⁶⁹

The best case scenario for Kosovo would be that it achieves Steiner's benchmarks in the near term and is able to survive on its own. This would allow for a substantial reduction in international civilian and military involvement. The UN and international community could then pursue a political settlement that grants Kosovo conditional independence. Serbia would have to agree to these conditions as well as relinquish its sovereignty of Kosovo. This may be possible if Serbia is granted the right incentives. Kosovo could be considered for outright

independence at a future date. A small international peacekeeping force would still be required for regional stability and to deter potential aggressors.

The worst case scenario is that Kosovo fails to meet Steiner's benchmarks over a reasonable time period and no political settlement is proposed. The UN and KFOR would be required indefinitely. This failure might also cause the UN and KFOR to leave Kosovo altogether without having achieved their objectives. The international community would view Kosovo's problems as unresolvable. If this were to happen, Kosovo would likely erupt into ethnic fighting. Regional aggressors would try to take advantage of the situation and fighting would spread beyond Kosovo's borders. This would require the international community to return to Kosovo and start all over again.

What is likely to happen is that Kosovo will make slow progress towards meeting the objectives laid out by the UN. The UN will continue to defer the political settlement of Kosovo until such time as Kosovo has made "sufficient" progress. The UN and KFOR will remain to provide both the leadership and stability Kosovo needs to continue to move forward. The UN and KFOR will slowly reduce manning levels as they transfer their responsibilities to the new institutions of Kosovo. Even if the UN is ultimately able to leave Kosovo, a peacekeeping force will be required to ensure both internal and external stability. Kosovo will look much like it does today with Serbs living in enclaves and multi-ethnicity a figment in the international communities' mind.

If the situation were not complicated enough, any political settlement finally reached will require a new UN resolution from the Security Council. Since UNSCR 1244 placed Kosovo under the UN as a protectorate, the UN will have to agree to any proposed solution. Even if an agreement can be reached between Belgrade and Pristina, in the end, the last word rests with the United Nations Security Council. The international community will remain engaged in Kosovo for an indefinite period into the future.

WORD COUNT = 8,203

ENDNOTES

¹ Final status refers to a future political settlement for Kosovo since it is currently under United Nations control. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 still recognizes the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sovereignty so technically Kosovo remains a province of Serbia until a political solution is reached. "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244," 10 June 1999; available from <http://www.usofficepristina.usia.co.at/1244.pdf.html>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2002, 2.

² UNMIK is the organization charged with the civil administration of Kosovo in order to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo. UNMIK is comprised of four "pillars" to carry out its functions. Pillar I is police and justice under the leadership of the UN. (This pillar originally started out as humanitarian assistance until it was phased out in June 2000 and the current Pillar I was established.) Pillar II is civil administration led by the UN. Pillar III is democratization and institution building led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Pillar IV is reconstruction and economic development led by the European Union (EU). United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. "UNMIK at a Glance," available from <http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.html>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2002.

³ Institute for Peace, Kosovo Final Status: Options and Cross-Border Requirements (Washington, D.C: Institute for Peace, 2002), 2.

⁴ Steiner is a German diplomat and the current head of UNMIK. He is the third to serve in this post since July 1999. Steiner is the senior international civilian in Kosovo and presides over the four pillars as well as being the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. "UNMIK at a Glance," available from <http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.html>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2002.

⁵ These benchmarks were developed by UNMIK to establish standards that Kosovo must attain before the question of final status can be addressed. There are eight categories which are: functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, returns and reintegration, economy, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protection Corps. Each of these categories has associated goals, benchmarks, and actions to be taken by local entities. Overarching the whole document are nonnegotiable general prerequisites such as compliance with UNSCR 1244 and the constitutional framework, multi-ethnicity, and tolerance. "UNMIK - Kosovo Benchmarks," available from http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/benchmarks_eng.pdf.html; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002.

⁶ United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, "UNMIK News Coverage," 13 November 2002; available from <http://www.unmikonline.org/news.html>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2002.

⁷ John Gordon IV et al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Rand Corporation, 1999), 109.

⁸ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244," 10 June 1999; available from <http://www.usofficepristina.usia.co.at/1244.pdf.html>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2002, 3.

⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, Balkans 2010 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 27.

¹¹ Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge (Brussels: Secretary General of NATO, 2000), 21-22.

¹² “In March 2002, an agreement on governance between Serbia and Montenegro was signed, officially changing the name of the country from the Republic of Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro and changing the federation into a Union of States. This ends the country known as Yugoslavia or the former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).” “Serbia and Montenegro Political Conditions,” available from

<http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=191&SECTION=SUB&TOPIC=POP_CO&TYPE=TEXT.html>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2002.

¹³ Institute for Peace, Kosovo Final Status: Options and Cross-Border Requirements (Washington, D.C: Institute for Peace, 2002), 2.

¹⁴ U.S. General Accounting Office, Balkan Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, April 2000), 85.

¹⁵ Khalil Osman, “US Raids Against UCPMB Help Serbs to Fight Kosovar Muslims,” 16-30 April 2000; available from <<http://www.muslimmedia.com/archives/world00/koso-ucpmb.html>>; Internet; accessed 1 February 2003. “Macedonia’s Liberation Army,” September 2001; available from <<http://www.worldpress.org/0901feature13.html>>; Internet; accessed 1 February 2003.

¹⁶ Ivo H. Daalder, “The United States, Europe, and the Balkans,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol 49, no. 1 (January/February 2002): 9.

¹⁷ “Rambouillet Agreement - Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,” available from <<http://www.usofficepristina.usia.co.at/doc1.html>>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2002, 42.

¹⁸ “Kosova” is the Albanian way to spell Kosovo. “New Kosovo Government Causing Concern for Macedonia,” 12 March 2002; available from <<http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=203450.html>>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2002.

¹⁹ United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe(Helsinki Commission), “United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing on Prospects for Ethnic Harmony in Kosovo,” 19 June 2002; available from <http://www.csce.gov/transcripts/transcript.cfm?briefing_id=218.html>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002, 9.

²⁰ United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, “UNMIK at a Glance,” available from <<http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.html>>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2002.

²¹ International Crisis Group, A Kosovo Roadmap (II) Internal Benchmarks (Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), 1.

²² Ibid., 5.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 7.

²⁵ Ibid., 5-6.

²⁶ Ibid., 10.

²⁷ Ibid., 9.

²⁸ Ibid., 15.

²⁹ Council on Foreign Relations, Balkans 2010 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 18.

³⁰ Reno L. Harnish, "An American View of Issues for Kosovo's Municipal Leaders," 24 October 2002; available from <<http://www.usofficepristina.usia.co.at/rh/rh6.html>>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2002.

³¹ Council on Foreign Relations, Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), 1-2.

³² International Crisis Group, A Kosovo Roadmap (II) Internal Benchmarks (Pristina/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002), 9.

³³ Ibid., 9.

³⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), 2.

³⁵ Dr. Mark Galeotti, "Albanian Gangs Gain Foothold in European Crime Underworld," 1 November 2001; available from <http://www4.janes.com/search97/vs.vts?action=View&VdkVgwkey=%2Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fmags%2Fjir%2Fhistory%2Fjir2001%2Fjir00462%2Ehtm&Docoffset=17&DocsFound=156&QueryZip=%28%5BO%2E8%50%28Dr%2E+Mark+Galeotti%29+%3Cor%3E++%5B1%2EO%5D%28+Dr%2E+Mark+Galeotti+%3Cand%3E+%28Dr%2E=Mark+Galeotti+%3Cin%3E=title%29+%29&Collection=archive%5FMags&SortSpec+PostDate+desc&ViewTemplate=doc%5Fjir2Ehts&Prod_Name=JIR&.html>; Internet; accessed 27 September 2002.

³⁶ Michael Steiner, "Fight Crime at its Source," 1 June 2002; available from <<http://www.unmikonline.org/press/oped/oped010602.html>>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2002.

³⁷ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244," 10 June 1999; available from <<http://www.usofficepristina.usia.co.at/1244.pdf.html>>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2002, 7.

³⁸ Ibid., 2.

³⁹ Council on Foreign Relations, Balkans 2010 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 17.

⁴⁰ C.J. Dick, Some Geopolitical Implications of the Kosovo Conflict (United Kingdom: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1999), 5.

⁴¹ United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe(Helsinki Commission), "United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing on Prospects for Ethnic Harmony in Kosovo," 19 June 2002; available from <http://www.csce.gov/transcripts/transcript.cfm?briefing_id=218.html>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002, 10.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 13-16.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁵ "Serbia and Montenegro Economic Overview," available from <http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=191&SECTION=SUB&TOPIC=MADVR&TYPE=TEXT.html>; Internet; accessed 30 September 2002.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Multinational Brigade East (MNB-E) is the United States led sector in Kosovo. The 10th Mountain Division (LI) provided the majority forces for KFOR rotation 4A which began November 21, 2001 and ended May 21, 2002. At the time of KFOR rotation 4A MNB-E was also comprised of a Polish-Ukrainian battalion, Greek battalion, Russian battalion, and 3 US battalions.

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⁴⁹ U.S. General Accounting Office, Balkan Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, April 2000), 5.

⁵⁰ United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe(Helsinki Commission), "United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing on Prospects for Ethnic Harmony in Kosovo," 19 June 2002; available from <http://www.csce.gov/transcripts/transcript.cfm?briefing_id=218.html>; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002, 11.

⁵¹ Council on Foreign Relations, Balkans 2010 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 27.

⁵² Institute for Peace, Kosovo Final Status: Options and Cross-Border Requirements (Washington, D.C: Institute for Peace, 2002), 1.

⁵³ Council on Foreign Relations, Balkans 2010 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 37.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 27.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Institute for Peace, Kosovo Final Status: Options and Cross-Border Requirements (Washington, D.C: Institute for Peace, 2002), 7.

⁵⁷ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244," 10 June 1999; available from <<http://www.usofficepristina.usia.co.at/1244.pdf.html>>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2002, 1.

⁵⁸ "Annan Meets with Yugoslav Leaders," 20 November 2002; available from <http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_wire.asp?vCOUNTRY=191&UID=790444.html>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2002.

⁵⁹ Institute for Peace, Kosovo Final Status: Options and Cross-Border Requirements (Washington, D.C: Institute for Peace, 2002), 8.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 9.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 12.

⁶⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, Balkans 2010 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 9.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 29.

⁶⁷ Institute for Peace, Kosovo Final Status: Options and Cross-Border Requirements (Washington, D.C: Institute for Peace, 2002), 10.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Dana H Allin et al., What Status for Kosovo (Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, 2001), 11.

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